


1606/5727

H O N O U R  
RETRIV'D FROM  
**F A C T I D R**  
IN A  
D I A L O G U E  
B E T W E E N  
S M I T H and J O H N S O N.

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H O N O U R  
 RETRIV'D FROM  
 FACTION:  
 IN A  
 D I A L O G U E  
 B E T W E E N  
*SMITH and JOHNSON.*

*Smith.* **W**ELL overtaken Mr. *Johnson* ; I hope I may now claim the promise you made me, of giving your Opinion about the Factions of the Old

*Roman* Commonwealth, which at last ended in the Tyranny of the *Cæsars* ; for now the Condition, upon which you gave me your promise, is fulfill'd, which was, That only you and I should be walking our Horses on the *Downs* together in a fair Morning : Tho' I cannot but wonder why you were so shy to other Day when I press'd you upon this Point, there being no Body with us, but two Honest Men for whom you and I both have a Kindness ; Pray then why were you so reserv'd, that you would not speak your mind then upon this Subject ?

A 2

*Johns.*

*Johns.* Because I had a mind to keep 'em my Friends still. You know that they are both in the high Party, and would have been uneasy if I should have spoken my mind freely, as you desired, tho' it had bin only concerning the Factions of Old *Rome*; for they would have suspected me of an *Innuendo* to the present Faction of Old *England*: Besides, I think, that at this time of Day no Man should disoblige any Party which has got the common People on its side. I will never endeavour to stem the Tide of the multitude, let the publick Weale shift for it self.

*Smith.* At this rate you are a meer Trimmer, a *Pomponius Atticus*, a sweetner of both Sides. You say that you will give me your Thoughts about Faction, and to what end will that be, but that I may avoid joyning with any Faction; and yet now you seem to be in a disposition of joyning your self to any Faction that is likely to prevail.

*Johns.* Truly, Mr. *Smith*, you have guessed wrong concerning my Intention; for 'twas in my Mind to give you an account of the Old *Roman* Factions, not to hinder you from joyning your self to any of our Modern Parties, but rather to direct you to what Party you should join your self, viz. To that which is most likely to be uppermost, and so to continue. But above all Things, avoid the Thoughts of opposing the motion of the Common People of *England*, be it what it will: For tho', two able and well-meaning Old *Romans*, *Brutus* and *Cassius*, never shew'd their Weakness so much, as by endeavouring to restore Liberty to a People who for sometime had lost the Sense of it, especially since *Brutus* (as *Plutarch* writes in his Life) was advised by *Statilius*, a *Roman* Senator (to whom he had communicated his design against *Caesar*) to desist from any such attempt; for, says *Statilius*, 'Tis an unwise part for you to put your Life in danger for the sake of ignorant Fools, and meer Asses.

And

And the event shew'd this his Advice to have been well-grounded, forasmuch as *Brutus*, and the other Senators, after that they had executed their design in taking off *Cæsar*, found that it was too late to restore the People to their former Liberty; for instead of summoning the People of *Rome* to resume their Freedom, they themselves were driven out of the City by the People whom they endeavoured to rescue, and afterwards prosecuted to Death by the Arms of *Octavius* and *Anthony*, each of whom design'd to Tyrannize over the *Romans*, who had then render'd themselves incapable of any other Government.

*Smith*. But what is this to the Case of Faction, which was the matter upon which I desired your present Thoughts?

*Johns*. 'Twas *Julius Cæsar*'s Faction, Sir, which had rendered the *Romans* unfit at that time to preserve their Liberty any longer, whereupon they abandoned themselves and their Country to Slavery. And this observation I took from *Paolo Paruta*, a Noble *Venetian*, who in his *Political Discourses* has Written thus, viz. "*Cæsar* seeing his Natural Endowments with  
 " wonderful Sagacity had wrought himself into  
 " great favour with the People, by his Humanity,  
 " Magnificence, Liberality, by his Familiarity with  
 " all Men; by his easie Pardoning of Offences, making of delightful Shews frequently, as well as  
 " sumptuous Feasts, and bestowing bountiful Gifts;  
 " by these means he had secured his Tyranny upon  
 " the sound Foundation of universal Favour, as well  
 " as the favour of particular Friends, whom he had  
 " preferred and interested in his own Power and  
 " Greatness. So that he who will duly consider these  
 " things (says this Noble *Venetian*) must confess that  
 " in *Brutus* and *Cassius* the Intention was more to be  
 " commended than the Act; for their Danger could  
 " bring no true Safety to the Commonwealth, as they  
 them-

“ themselves were soon aware of, by flying from that  
 “ City which they ought to have summon'd to Liberty.  
 “ ty.

*Smith.* I perceive that you make light of *Brutus's* Conspiracy, which I thought to have been a Matter of great Importance, and well concerted, tho' by accident it Miscarried; I am sure that *Brutus's* part in that Matter has been much debated amongst the most eminent Moralists. I should be glad to know your opinion of that matter.

*Johns.* The Objection on *Cæsar's* side against *Brutus*, amounts to this; That whereas *Brutus* had taken up Arms against *Cæsar*, and through the Fortune of War, had been taken Captive by *Cæsar's* Soldiers, yet *Cæsar* had given him his Life and Liberty; and moreover, to shew his extraordinary Affection to him, he made him his Heir by Will: With which generosity of *Cæsar's*, the People of *Rome* were so much affected, that they preferred their Revenge of *Brutus's* Ingratitude, before their own Liberty, which they might have recovered, by joining with him. But on the other side, 'tis said in behalf of *Brutus*, That he could not acknowledge *Cæsar's* pardon for a Favour, because he had never deserved Ill at *Cæsar's* Hands; since that by taking up Arms in behalf of his Country against a Tyrant, he did his Duty, and deserved Well; and 'twas the highest Impudence in *Cæsar*, to pretend to pardon the greatest Merit, for such it was, to defend the Liberty of his Country, at the Hazard of his Life: Moreover, 'twas the highest affront that *Cæsar* could put upon *Brutus*, to think that he was such a Villain as ever to forgive *Cæsar's* Usurpation: Nor was there any generosity in *Cæsar's* pardoning any one whom he took Prisoners, for he only gave them their Lives to secure his own; nor did he name *Brutus* in his Will, but with a design to draw him away from the Duty which he owed to his Country.

Ungrateful

—— Ungrateful *Brutus* do they call?  
Ungrateful *Cæsar* who would *Rome* enthral.

*Cowley.*

*Smith.* These are a sort of superfine Notions inconsistent with the stream of Loyalty, which is current in our days: Indeed if you will suppose Men to be born only for the common good of their Country, 'twill be hard to justify *Cæsar's* attempt of changing the established Government of *Rome* meerly for his own private Interest: But I beg your pardon for making you digress so long from the business you began upon, for I do not see any thing in all this Story of *Brutus*, *Cassius*, and *Cæsar*, which explains the Nature of the Factions in old *Rome*, which was the point in hand.

*Johns.* I think that I was not far from the point in hand, when I intimated to you, that a Faction sometimes ariseth so high in a Civil Government, that 'tis every Mans Prudence to keep Measures with it, as it appears from the fruitless attempt of *Brutus* upon *Cæsar*, whom, tho' he took away by the Dagger, yet *Rome* being addicted to the Interest of *Cæsar*, became in a manner his Faction; only having suffered themselves to be bribed by him out of the Sense of their former Liberties, and for this Reason it was that *Brutus* and *Cassius* were persecuted to Death by the Citizens who were necessitated to perpetuate the chief Command in one Person, lest, by remitting the Commonwealth into Liberty, their own Licentiousness should be restrained. Hence it proceeded, that when *Octavius*, the adopted Son of *Julius Cæsar* return'd into *Italy*, he was joyfully received by the Army, and as much beloved by the People as *Julius* himself had been, out of Hopes that they might have their Licentious Favours continued, which his Uncle *Julius* had formerly allowed them.

Nor

Nor was this the Disposition only of the Army and the Mob of *Rome*: But tho' the Fact lately committed upon the Person of *Caesar*, was approved by the Senate, yet there were several Persons of eminent Figure in the Senate, who, being *Caesar's* Friends, disapproved it, as *Marcus Antonius*, and *Lepidus*, who openly maintained, that *Brutus* and *Cassius* ought to be pursued by the publick Arms, as Enemies to the Commonwealth, and that *Caesar's* death ought to be Revenged; and from this Resentment it was, that *Brutus* and *Cassius* were forced to gather what Arms they could for their own Defence, and to have recourse to Forreign Princes, and with Forreign Soldiers to fill their Armies which were rais'd to Defend the Commonwealth of *Rome*: Whereas the *Romans* themselves were furious for Monarchy, nor had the Senate any Authority with them afterwards.

*Smith.* I was never fond of Republican Principles in my Life, and yet I cannot but wonder, that the *Roman* People who had been so very successful under the direction of a Senate, should on a sudden fall in Love with Monarchy; especially when their own History would inform them, that their Forefathers could not bear with a Monarchical Government; but changed it for a Commonwealth, by driving out the *Tarquin* Family, and setting up Consuls in the room of Kings: And also after this, when *Appius Claudius*, and the other *Decemviri* attempted to Tyrannize over the City, yet the People, at that time, soon restored themselves to Liberty. Wherefore I cannot but wonder again and again, how the Genius of *Rome* came to be so much alter'd as it was then, when *Brutus* had dispatch'd *Caesar*; and that which still adds to my Amazement is, that the *Roman* People in *Caesar's* Days, were much more numerous, than in the time of *Appius* and the *Decemviri*. The City being now in such a state of exaltation, that the  
Power

Power of the People was never so well worth preserving as at that Time: Nor was the Liberty which they enjoy'd under the late Senate out of their remembrance, whereas in the time of their first Kings the name of Liberty was not so much as none, much less did they then feel the Benefit thereof; and yet under the Government of Kings the City had been so successful, that it might seem hazardous to change the form of Government, for a new one of which they had no experience. Nay, if you will consider the Government of the *Decemviri*, even that retain'd the shew of a Commonwealth; and since very many bare a part therein, the People might have expected to have submitted thereunto upon better Conditions than they could hope for from *Julius Caesar*, who had reduc'd the Scheme of all Affairs to himself, by taking upon him all the chief Offices of the State: So that the People must have bin strangely blinded that they could not see the imminent Danger of a Tyranny from him: Which if they had in any wise apprehended, methinks they might easily have found a Remedy in a City so full of Nobility and Great Men, many of whom must needs have been generously inclin'd, as one might have well hoped, so that *Caesar's* novel self-erected Dominion could not be supposed to stand upon any solid foundation; and if he should fall, what could have bin expected but the rise of the old *Roman* Liberty? So that laying all these things together, 'tis still a matter of astonishment to me how the contrary effect came to pass.

*Johns.* Truly Mr. *Smith*, since all Things are in a continual Motion, I should as much wonder if Mens Inclinations should for any long time stand at a stay: There is no such thing as a Settlement in the World; wherefore it would have bin strange if the *Roman*, or any other People, should for many Agees continue to have bin what they were at first, a Sober and Virtuous

B

Frugal

Frugal People. Mens various Circumstances are always working a change in their Tempers. Thus when *Rome* was in a low Condition, the Citizens were far from ambitious Thoughts, or any desire of bearing sway over their fellow Citizens, every one was well contented to discharge a Publick Duty when 'twas lay'd upon him; and whilst they had this just and modest apprehension of a Trust, that they were to discharge it only for the sake of the Publick Weal, the Publick Offices were rather Honourable than Profitable: Nor was there any temptation to bandying, siding, party-taking, and bringing into Offices. Then *Lucius Quintius* was but barely contented to leave the oversight of his Plough, and take upon him the high Office of *Dictator*, which was answerable to the Office of Lord High Constable in *England*. This Honest Roman was indeed highly commended for taking this great Trust upon him in that Time of publick Danger, as he well deserv'd; but would have bin thought a Madman had he intrigued and canvass'd for it. But afterwards, when through the prosperous Condition of the Commonwealth publick Trusts came to be highly profitable, 'twas no wonder that many courted them for private advantage: And hereby Faction and Party-taking were introduc'd, which by its gradual increase corrupted all Orders of Men, till at last it reduc'd the Commonwealth to such weakness that it fell down, and had not strength enough to raise herself up again.

*Smith.* Pray, Sir, how did this Corruption prevail at first? and amongst what sort of People?

*Johns.* It began amongst the Soldiers to whom their Commanders gave too great a Liberty, and then indulg'd them by degrees in such an unbridled Licentiousness as had not been known in former Ages: And this they did with a prospect that they might dispose them as they pleased to oppress their particular Enemies.

mies. This Licentiousness was most notoriously allow'd by *Sylla* and *Marius* to lessen each other; and this exorbitant Power was afterwards so constantly usurp'd by eminent Citizens, and particularly by Commanders of Armies, that it seem'd an astonishment to *Rome*, that *Pompy* the Great, who for some time had out-shone all other Citizens in Glory, should be contented, after that he had finished successfully his War against *Mithridates*, to quit his Army, when every one fear'd that he would have enter'd *Rome* at the Head of it, and assum'd the Chief Magistracies to himself, as *Cæsar* did soon after. This was what *Pompy* might easily have done, so great was the disorder of that Age, and so little was the authority of Laws or Senate regarded: And therefore *Cæsar's* attempt succeeded so well; because at that time this Corruption, which at first enter'd into the Soldiers, had then taken possession of the Senators, and by them was spread wide among the common People, who had for some time been constantly bribed, and treated for their Votes to confer Offices of Dignity and Profit; and the Generals of Armies, who had enriched themselves with the Spoils of War, were thereby enabled to guide the Votes of the People in Favour of their Partisans, and every Party or Faction (call it which you please) was a Breach in the Health of the *Roman* Constitution: But then most notoriously appeared to be so when the Senate it self gave into the Corruption, and many Senators became Dependants upon those who commanded their Armies, and as many more adhered in a resolute Factionous manner to particular eminent Citizens in publick Civil Offices, who headed Parties, and endeavoured after Novelties.

*Smith.* But Sir, I do not understand, why this adhesion of particular Citizens should be called a Faction, because 'twas absolutely necessary as Affairs

then stood, to counterballance that Party who were endeavouring to impose a matter upon the publick; and 'twas upon this Honest Reason, that *Cicero* and some other Worthy Patriots gave into *Pompy's* side, to over-ballance the Faction of *Julius Caesar*.

*Johns.* 'Tis true Mr. *Smith*, that several noble Senators assisted *Pompy*, with a design, at first, to support the Commonwealth against those who had been immoderately advanced by the favour of the People, to the injury of other Citizens of greater Merit: But in a little time, they who had taken up Arms, in behalf of the Commonwealth, became as burdensom, and dangerous thereunto, by increasing the Power of some particular person whom they too much favoured. I confess that the opposite Parties still ballanced one another, but both lay heavy upon the publick, and oppressed its Liberty; for, hereby the Senate came to have but little share of the Government, so that all things by this means went to Confusion, because not the Worthy and the Brave, but the Bold and Insolent found the greatest Trust in the State; and when it came to be publicly taken notice of, that they who adhered to *Sylla's* party had gotten most Riches and Preferments, many others being allured by hopes of like Advantages, were drawn to favour the like Confusion; and to assist the Interest of some one single Person, that they might obtain the like advantage; and from this partiality it was, That they who favoured the Publick went without Reward; since 'twas not the Interest of any one Man to take them into particular Regard, and bestow those Bounties upon them which Ambitious Men will give to their Partisans, for raising them to eminent Powers and Dignities. No wonder then that at this time *Brutus* and *Cassius* did not find that general approbation which was given formerly to *Junius Brutus* and *Virginius*, because one of them had rescued *Rome* from the

the Tyranny of the *Tarquins*, and the other from the *Decemviri*.

*Smith*. But pray then Sir, by what means did *Sylla* provide so plentifully for his Faction, so as to lay so strong a Temptation upon the *Romans*, to favour the Factions of their eminent Citizens?

*Johns*. Only by being so lucky as to suppress *Marinus* and his Faction, for immediately he gave away the Estates and Places of *Marinus*'s followers (whom, before he had marked by proscription) to his own Faction, and hereby he set an example to all following Leaders of Parties.

*Smith*. Pray then what was this Proscription?

*Johns*. Only *Sylla* published in the City the Names of those whom he destined to Destruction; the same did *Marinus* to distress *Sylla*'s party.

*Smith*. You have satisfied me Mr. *Johnson* as much as I can reasonably demand, and yet methinks 'tis wonderful that so prodigious a change should be made in a People so Governable, Honest, and Brave, and also so strongly affected with the Love of their Country, as were the old *Romans*, who had nothing so much at Heart as the Honour and Dignity of their Country, and yet at last suffer'd themselves to be so trampled upon, that soon after their State was dwindled into a Monarchy, *Nero*, by Vote of the Senate, promoted his Horse to the Consular Dignity of *Rome*; an Insult which was never parallell'd in any Government tho' ever so Tyrannical.

*Johns*. 'Twas by their own default that they suffer'd so vile an Indignity; were there no corruption among Mankind, they might live very well with one another under any Government, or under no Government at all; but where Corruption takes place in Mens Inclinations, no Government can stand long. *Romulus*, who founded the Commonwealth, was no deep learned Politician, nor were any of the Kings, his Successors,  
any

any otherwise than what he was ; but yet as long as they carried on their Administration Honestly, and aimed at the publick Interest, they were well obeyed by the People, till *Tarquin*, at last, became Headstrong, and would have his own Will prevail, over the Law ; and then the People, being Virtuous, soon deposed him ; and *Junius Brutus* vested the Regal Administration in two Officers, stil'd *Consuls*, because they were to consult the publick Weal, but still under the Direction of a Senate ; and could this *Junius Brutus* have foreseen, that the Peoples perpetuating this Consular Dignity in the same hands for several Years together, would have raised such Factions, and introduced such Corruptions as followed, he would, doubtless, have made it Fundamental to that high Office, That every Consul should have been left out of place for some Years, before he should have been capable of a Re-admittance ; for 'tis evident, that the People, by continuing this Office in *Marius*, corrupted their Government, and made way for *Cæsar's* Usurpation.

*Smith* And yet methinks, the longer a Man stays in an Office, the better he will understand it, and be the better able to discharge it.

*Johns.* 'Tis true, Mr. *Smith*, if we could be sure of Integrity in an Officer, no matter how long he were continued in his place ; but since great opportunities of private Advantage do so frequently corrupt Mens Minds, Rotation in Offices is very expedient to preserve sincerity ; to which I may add, That the nature of publick Offices, tho' ever so great, may soon be understood by Industrious and Sensible Men, and will be well executed by those who intend only to serve the publick ; nor will a years time be always sufficient to inform an Officer of all the indirect Advantages he may make of his Place ; at least, it will not be sufficient to discover so much as several Years will

will shew him : If one Man were suffered to be Lord Mayor of *London* for Seven Years together, I should fear, lest the Office should be corrupted ever after ; but when any Political Constitution, requires, that the Head thereof shall continue for Life, there it is absolutely necessary, that the Subalterns should be frequently changed.

*Smith.* Well, I agree with you Mr. *Johnson*, and have thought on another Reason for Rotation, because frequent use of Changes, reconciles Men to 'em the better ; for he, who for some Considerable time has bin possess'd of a Place, will take it very grievously to be turn'd out of it, and make all possible interest to be restored again ; and this puts me in mind of our Parties in *England*, which, I am apt sometimes to think, carry some small resemblance to the days of *Marius* and *Sylla* in old *Rome*.

*Johns.* I wish there were no resemblance between them : And that there were some expedient found out to allay all heats in the Nation ; for no good can be foreseen from them. I remember that in King *Charles* the Second's Reign, Faction arose to so high a degree, that matters were carried almost to a Proscription ; for the Laws were of little use in Tryal of Causes, nor were Causes Tryed at all ; but the *Men* who brought 'em were Try'd by Judges and Juries, and as their Parties were found, so their Causes Succeeded.

*Smith.* But surely, Sir, you carry this matter too far ; for why must I be thought to be of a Faction, because I Vote for a Man whom I take to be fittest to discharge an Office ?

*Johns.* I am far from thinking so, if that be all the Reason of your Voting ; for this is the only Reason that ought to prevail with all Men, and will most certainly prevent Faction, which ever arises from private Views, particular Interests, and perhaps, sometimes,  
( but

( but very seldom ) out of mere Fancy of liking, or disliking, without any real Cause on either side ; but however, in such a Country as ours, there can be no Reason for stily adhering to some one Man or Party of Men, for the Discharge of publick Trusts, where there is so great a Choice of able Men of all sorts : And if the Free-holders of *England* should charge their Members of Parliament at every Election, this expedient alone would prevent much Faction in the Land ; and there would not be so much Caballing for Places at Court, if they likewise lasted no longer than Seats in the Parliament House.

*Smith.* I do again acknowledge my Satisfaction in your Opinion of Rotation in Offices of Trust ; it will keep the Administration sweeter, as a running Stream is in comparison of a standing Lake : And hereupon I will give you an account of a certain Politick, which at this Day subsists in the Island of *Van Dunk*, desiring also your Opinion of it, as I relate the matter of Fact to you.

*Johns.* With all my Heart, Mr. *Smith.*

*Smith.* This Island lies about Thirty Leagues South-west from the Isle of *Ceyton* (in the *Indian Sea*) where the *Dutch* have a Settlement, it bears its name from a *Dutch* Sailor who first discovered it to the *Europeans* ; 'tis subjected by its Politick to a Monarchical Administration, in a right Line descending to the Heirs Female, the Male Line being excluded there, as the Female Line in *France* ; so that its Government may not improperly be stiled a *Queendom*. There are many Places of great Dignity and Revenue belonging to the Administration ; for obtaining whereof all necessary means are used, such as flattery of the Queen and People ; entertainments of the Mob ; Bribery ; and such like Mollifications, which are frequently made use of with an Unsparing Hand : Hereby the whole Body of the People are formed into Parties,  
the

the Chiefs and Subalterns whereof are well known to each other, as well as to their respective Factions; but the only matter of dispute between 'em, is, who shall enjoy the publick Trusts of the Government. *Dorgambo*, who at present holds the Sovereign Administration, is willing to gratify both Parties if she could; and therefore in the beginning of her Reign she chose her Officers out of each Party in equal proportions; but this method has not succeeded, because each Party is so inveterate against the other, that neither of 'em will suffer a Coalition, but each Faction would ingross the whole Trust of the Island to it self; inso-much that the Queen was compell'd to the Expedient of *Alternation*, by chusing Her Officers out of one Party, and after Seven years Discharge of their Offices she displac'd them, and substituted those of the other Party in their Room. Now this is, as I suppose, what you, Mr. *Johnson*, call'd Rotation; but it has this inconvenience in it, that the Suddenness of the Change makes a shake in the Nation, and may one time or other raise such a fury, as may break out into a Civil War, and overturn the Monarchy. Pray then what is your opinion of this Case?

*Johns.* 'Tis very hazardous for a Nation to be divided into two Parties, especially if they are near to an equality; in such a Case, I look upon the Publick Government to be in a manner Dissolv'd, at least it cannot exert it self with any Vigour, and I cannot but pity *Dorgambo*, because a Woman is not so fit to encounter such a Difficulty, but it requires a Masculine Spirit to subdue such a concurrence of Factions. However, Policy sometimes goes beyond Strength, and I believe that there may be found out ways and means either to unite these Factions, or, at least, to calm and allay their Fury; but before I can enter into the detail of these means, I must be inform'd by you what are the pretences these Factions make for them-

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selves,

selves, to exclude each other from the profitable Trusts of their Country; and what has been their late Behaviour towards one another.

*Smith.* Their pretensions on both sides are very specious; and if they were real, there could no Danger arise from them; for the *Mulmuts* say, That they Love the Queen better than the *Fumfums*; and the *Fumfums* say, That they Love their Country better than the *Mulmuts*.

*Johns.* If this be all, I can see no Reason why the Queen may not extend her Royal Favours equally to both Parties; for I suppose the *Fumfums* have no Quarrel to the Queen, nor the *Mulmuts* to their Country.

*Smith.* No, no; Each Party pretends equal Duty to the Queen, and Love to their Country, but yet while the *Fumfums* enjoy'd the Royal Favour, the *Mulmuts* were so highly discontented, that a Rebellion was fear'd to break out in the Island, and therefore her Majesty's Chief Wizard of State, advis'd *Dorgambo* to turn out the *Fumfums* and pacify the *Mulmuts* with their Places; and in due time, I make no doubt, but that the *Fumfum* will be as impatient to be restored again.

*Johns.* If the matter be thus, Mr. *Smith*, were I in *Dorgambo*'s case, I should think that neither of the Parties either loved Me or their Country, but each of 'em had only their own private Interest at Heart. But what think you Mr. *Smith*, Be there no Honest Men in the Island?

*Smith.* Yes, I believe that there may be some such; but the difficulty will be how to find 'em out.

*Johns.* But 'tis necessary to seek for 'em; for some expedient must be found out to put an end to these Factions, or a Civil War will certainly ensue, which will have its crisis in a Tyranny, or else in a Commonwealth, as bad as a Tyranny. For the Fortune of War would so much exalt the Victorious Faction, that

that it would render the Conquered Party Objects of the severest Hatred and Oppression ; nay, the *Fumfums* themselves, who pretend so much to the Love of their Country, and to Principles of Liberty, will, upon this occasion, find themselves oblig'd by Interest (which in all Parties is stronger than Principle) to keep the *Mulmuts* in due Subjection, and to exercise wholsom Severities upon an implacable Party, as they will be call'd, if they should happen to be Conquered. Wherefore I conclude, That 'tis absolutely necessary to quell or quiet these two dangerous Parties.

*Smith.* I agree with you ; but how shall it be done ? To me it seems impossible.

*Johns.* 'Twill be difficult ; but in such a dangerous Case as I take this to be, it is better to do something at a venture, and try a Chance, than to do nothing at all ; and I am of Opinion, that if *Dorgambo* had continued her former expedient of equally promoting both Parties, Time and the Loaves might have reconciled them ; but to take the Factions into Royal Favour by turn, is the way to perpetuate them for ever. Besides, this Alternation will bring a suspicion upon *Dorgambo* her self, That as the two Factions have nothing else at Heart, but each his own private Interest, so the Queen may have the same sort of private view to keep her People in a Mercenary Slavish dependance upon her self ; for 'tis as much as to say to each Party, See that you make it your business to make your selves acceptable to me, and to promote my Will and Pleasure, whilst you are in Places of Trust and Profit, else I shall turn you *Fumfums* out of your Posts, and give 'em to the *Mulmuts*, who will know how to behave themselves better than you have done. This proceeding will debase the Spirit of the People, and make 'em Slaves to Arbitrary Will and Pleasure ; and 'twill be no Honour to *Dorgambo* to

be a Queen of Slaves by Parties ; and if these Slaves should Mutiny, tho' it be only against each other, the Queen would lose the Government over both Parties.

*Smith.* Not at all unlikely, and therefore, pray then Mr. *Johnson*, what expedient would you advise in this desperate Case ?

*Johns.* Truly, were I *Dorgambo's* Counsellor, I would advise her to take a handle from these Factions to restore Virtue, and raise a Spirit of Honour in the Island, which alone can recover a sinking Government ; for if Honour can be retriev'd, *Dorgambo's* Government will be as steady as the Center of the Earth.

*Smith.* Well, Do this, and I'll say you are a Politician.

*Johns.* Nay, I will not promise that my Expedient shall succeed ; but I think it may be try'd with safety, and may possibly have its effect.

*Smith.* Well, what is it ?

*Johns.* Since both Parties are so very desirous of Court-preferments, let Court honours be the rewards of their Service, and let all the *Salaries* be reduc'd to a sufficient Mediocrity.

*Smith.* Very right Mr. *Johnson*, for great Salaries are only great Baits, for Covetous or Luxurious Men, neither of whom are the fittest to manage publick Affairs ; and it may well be supposed, that they who will accept of publick Trusts, and discharge them for small Pensions, have really a Love for their Queen and Country too.

*Johns.* These two Things I would carry on hand in hand, they can never be separated.

*Smith.* I perceive your Design, and would endeavour to carry on your Project yet further ; for I would advise that there should be no Salaries at all annexed to Offices of the highest Dignity at Court ; Menial Servants must be subsisted, who have nothing

to live upon but their Wages. Now if there be any Sense of Honour left in the Island, this Test will discover it; and the best of Men will lay hold on this opportunity to offer their Service to their Queen and Country without Reward.

*Johns.* I confess that you have improv'd my thought, and if the Genius of the Islanders be agreeable, 'tis the best thing that can be done; but care must be taken, that we do not strain the string too high at first, lest it break. I pray then therefore, before I settle this point with you, let me know what is the Genius and Disposition of the People of *Van Dunk's* Island.

*Smith.* By what I have understood of 'em, they are an Honest-meaning, Half-witted People; but yet capable of any business they think fit to apply themselves to; and some few among them, have as deep a penetration as any of our *Europeans*; but their Misfortune is, that all of 'em are so far given up to Luxury, that no Man can be had in any esteem among them, tho' he be ever so able and honest, unless he does conform to the fashionable Luxury of the Country, live Splendidly, and give Bountiful Entertainments to his Neighbours to gain their Respect.

*Johns.* If this be the Temper of the People, 'tis worse for the Queen and Country than I thought it might have been; for no Politick, let it be ever so well formed, but must sink under the Oppression of such a Distemper: But why must the common People be courted so much by the Men of Estates? What can they do to requite the Gentlemen for their great Treats?

*Smith.* O! Sir, I must tell you that the Island is divided into Ninety nine Districts, and when the Queen has any business of very great importance, she calls out of these Districts so many Counsellors to assist her with Money and Advice, and by this means these publick

publick Counsellors gain opportunities to introduce themselves into the Royal Favour, and to get Places at Court.

*Johns.* Worse and worse Mr. *Smith*; for at this rate the Country is but a Tool to serve a Court interest, and the common People sell themselves for Treats and needless Entertainments; and it may from hence be expected, that some Rich designing Fellow, may take a time to treat them munificently, and make his Advantage of them afterwards, as *Julius Caesar* serv'd the *Romans*; when they gave themselves up to Luxury and Riot, he treated them, and entertained them with fine shews, and then put them all up into his Pocket at once.

*Smith.* How could he do that Trick, I pray you?

*Johns.* He got himself to be owned as perpetual *Dictator*, whereby he became the Head of the whole Administration, and after that he had no occasion to treat the Citizens any more; but made himself obeyed without stooping so low as he had formerly done.

*Smith.* How could he procure the Senate of *Rome* to consent to his assuming this great Power to himself?

*Johns.* He had prevail'd, upon the Citizens sometime before, to continue his Consulship for four Years together; and when they had given him so long a Command over the Army, 'twas too late for the Senate to deny him any thing, unless they would venture to be proscribed, and have their Throats Cut by his Soldiers: *Marius* and *Sylla* having set a late example of that sort, which, at this time, was fresh in Memory.

*Smith.* Well Sir, you were saying, that if Men will sell themselves for Victuals and Drink, they will be reduced to a low Condition of Fortune; for they who buy them will sell them, and the Trade will still go on as it does in *Van Dunk's* Island, where they who buy

buy the Peoples Votes, to make themselves chief Counsellors to *Dorgambo*, will sell their own Votes for Places and Pensions: Whereupon with relation to *Dorgambo's* Monarchy over this Island, a certain Dutch Man compos'd this Political Catechise.

Q. *What is Monarchy?* A. The Art of Suppressing the Rights of a free People.

Q. *How does it differ from Tyranny?* A. By the different means made use of to the same end.

Q. *As how?* A. Tyranny makes use of Force: Monarchy of Fraud chiefly.

Q. *What are the chief Instruments of Monarchy?* A. Superstition and Bribery.

Q. *How does Superstition operate?* A. By oppressing the Spirits of Men thro' Fear.

Q. *How does Bribery operate?* A. By gratifying Pride and Luxury, with Place and Pension.

This Dutch Man you will say was a Man of Antimonarchical Principles: But your design is not to confound, but to preserve this Monarchy, by taking away Salaries and Pensions: And thus much I can apprehend of the matter, tho' I am no Politician, yet I understand good Eating and Drinking, and I know that it will take some time to spend great Salaries in curious Entertainments, and therefore it cannot be expected that these great Officers should spend all their time upon the publick Service.

*Johns.* You observe well, and methinks the Labour of a Statesman does not require so much Eating and Drinking, as the Work of a Day Labourer: Besides, much Eating and Drinking clouds the Thoughts: *Mens Brains and their Shirts shrink in the wetting,* 'tis Temperance which fits Men for Business; so that the expedient I would recommend to *Dorgambo* would quash the Factions, and quicken the Wits of the Nation.

Smith.

*Smith.* Nay, Sir, I think your Project goes yet two steps further ; hereby you would save the Money, and raise the Honour of the Nation. Besides, you will do the Queen and Country Service, in putting their greatest Trust, into the hands of the best Men : The Queen would be very glad to find out such Servants upon whom she might intirely depend ; for I hear, that she does begin to suspect, that the boasted Loyalty of the *Mulmats* is too much owing to their Places and Pensions ; and that the great Love which the *Fumsums* pretend to their Country, is not without the Prospect of a Place at Court.

*Johns.* In short Mr. *Smith*, if the Queen could prevail with her Council of Ninety nine Men to reduce all Salaries belonging to publick Trusts into moderate bounds, the Factions would soon be weary of contending for 'em, the bone of Contention would be taken away.

*Smith.* But why may not the Queen do this of her own accord, but must trouble her great Council about it ?

*Johns.* Because 'tis the best of Her policy to avoid disobliging either Party ; for you may be sure that that Party which is in possession of the Places of Profit when the Salaries shall be reduced, will grumble, and perhaps blame the Queen for her ill timing of the thing, she might have staid till the Trusts had been out of their hands ; either Party would make this excuse to shew their Resentments : Wherefore she should be neutral to a nicety ; for her Partiality might raise Contention between the Factions, which might soon be blown up into a Flame, and then 'tis great odds, but that she may lose her Dominion over the Island.

*Smith.* Why should you think so Mr. *Johnson* ?

*Johns.* Because whatever Faction she Favours will be surely overcome, if a War should break out, for the Favourite Faction will be intollerably Insolent and Pro.

Provoking in their Behaviour, and whatever Creature is highly provoked, will raise within it self double the Strength which otherwise it could put forth, and since the Factions are near at a *Par*, which ever of them gives the Affront will pay severely for it.

*Smith.* It makes me smile to see how much you Reason like Mr *Hobes*, who in his Dialogue upon the Civil Wars of *England*, asks this Question, *Why did the Roundheads beat the Cavaliers?* And answers, *Because they fought with more spite than the Cavaliers.* And I believe that he gave the right Answer to the Question; for I have heard that the Cavaliers were very Insolent and Provoking, and that the *Roundheads* were a peevish, self-will'd People, and bitter in their Resentments.

*Johns.* I agree with Mr. *Hobes's* Reason, if *Roundheads* fought with more Spite, which was raised by the insolent Behaviour of the Cavaliers, who had long treated them with the lowest degree of Contempt; this Treatment call'd up all their Fury, which was sufficiently felt by their Enemies; and the King, who favoured the unfortunate Party, fell, together with them.

*Smith.* Well then, Mr. *Johnson*, I agree with you, that the Queen shall desire her great Council, to take this Work off her Hands. But how far shall the publick Salaries be reduced?

*Johns.* So far as may be suitable to the Trusts whereunto they belong; as for Instance, if an Officer's whole time be required for the discharge of his Duty, he should be allowed such a Salary as may support him in a Frugal way for his whole Livelyhood; if the Office does but take up half his time, then half maintenance is sufficient; and so in proportion.

*Smith.* Alas! Sir, you might have spared your self the labour of this project; for all the Officers belonging to *Dorgambo's* Court, cannot stir from

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Home

Home without Coach and Horses, and must keep plentiful Tables for their Friends and Acquaintance, or else they will make no Figure in Court or Country; this Reformation which you have projected is impracticable at first View.

*Johns.* If it be so, then the good Government of *Van Dunk's* Island will not be practicable very long; I have shew'd you already, That *Rome* its self, the greatest and strongest of all Dominions, lost its Liberty, when it lost its Virtue; and more especially when the People lost their Frugality: Then it was that the Common People, at the charge of the Nobles, Eat and Drank themselves out of their Wits and Liberties, and so did the Senate themselves, and so will the People of *Van Dunk's* Island, if they may be suffered to be Feasted and Bribed out of that Free, Legal Administration which is happily set over them: Wherefore, of all Virtues, the publick Government ought to encourage Frugality, which is the Foundation of Health to the Body Politick, as well as Natural. But why do you think this expedient so very impracticable?

*Smith.* Because 'tis a Contradiction to the Genius of the Body of the People, an Officer thus reform'd would become a Laughing stock, no Man living in the Island would accept an Office upon these Terms.

*Johns.* But I think that a Man needs not fear being made a Laughing stock, who has power in his hands, and knows how to use it discreetly; for Power it self draws a respect from Mankind, unless it be used Foolishly, and then it draws Contempt: Nor will a Virtuous Man, tho' Poor, be laugh't at but by Fools, whose Laughter only renders themselves contemptible. But why will no body accept of Places, when a Place will yield a competent maintenance for a Man to live frugally upon, and will help to breed up his Family? I grant, that Luxurious and extravagant Men will not

not serve Offices upon these Terms, and this will be an advantage to the Publick, whose Trusts ought not to be executed by such Men; but Frugal and Industrious Men will accept of a competent Livelyhood, attended with Power and Dignity, and such a one will discharge his Trust with Honesty and Diligence, since his small Salary will excuse him from spending either his Money or his Time upon unnecessary Entertainments.

*Smith.* What you say, Sir, has a shew of Reason, if Men would be govern'd by Reason; but Custom, which is the great Tyrant that Rules the World, has so prevailed over these Islanders, that they will not, nay, now they cannot pay any Respect to a Magistrate who does not live in such Splendour as usually sets off the Character of such an Officer.

*Johns.* At this rate Mr. *Smith*, I perceive that no Qualification at all is regarded in the Island, but meer Wealth and Extravagancy joyn'd together. But methinks that a Rich Frugal Man may deserve respect among them, because that at one time or other the Wealth he has sav'd, may be a support to his Country when it shall be in danger of a Foreign Enemy; but if it be made necessary by Custom, for a Man to spend all that he has in an extravagant manner, pray then who shall gain it? I fear 'twill be sent out of the Island, to purchase some nice foreign entertainments, which brings so much loss, and, at last, impoverishment to the Island. Such an extravagant Humour as this bids Defiance to all kinds of Virtue, and if a Man cannot be respected for his Wisdom and Integrity to the publick Weal, nor for his prudent management of his own private Fortune, but on the contrary, where only the Squanderer is well esteemed by all Men, even by those, who only have heard of, but never partook of his extravagant profusion; such an Island is fit to be sunk into the Sea, having forfeited

the Concern of every good Citizen, if there be any such among them, by Idolizing Vice, and Stigmatizing Virtue. I dare affirm, That such a Nation has absolved every good Man from all Duty to his Native Country ; the best Men having only this Obligation upon them, to make the best Terms they can with the Tyrant into whose hands they must fall.

*Smith.* Hold there Mr. *Johnson*, I cannot believe that you would forsake your Father because he was fallen into a Phrensy : Much less your Country.

*Johns.* True, Mr. *Smith*, I should not, because I should hope for my Father's Recovery ; and if my Country was cast into a phrensy thro' the raving of an extravagant Orator, in the publick Theatre, a thing which never happened in *Athens* or *Sparta*, yet I should hope for a recovery in some few years at least ; but when a Nation is wholly abandon'd to extravagancy and Faction, as you have described this Island, there is no hope left of recovery, before it be brought to the utmost Misery.

*Smith.* Truly, Sir, this Island has been brought to very great Miseries already, they had a long, and bloody Civil War amongst themselves ; and after they had recover'd out of it, they suffer'd severely, by Plague, Fire, and Famine ; but all this did them no good, and I wonder what 'tis they want to bring them to the utmost Misery : From whence you are willing to suppose, that they may recover to a Sense of Honour and Virtue ?

*Johns.* Only another Civil War, which will end in their overthrow, by a Foreign Enemy ; for 'tis possible, that by this means their Factions may lay aside their strugglings for Places and Pensions, and their Enemy may also teach them Frugality, which Virtue alone must lay the Foundation of all Oeconomical and Political prosperity.

*Smith.* I know not what Skill you may have in Prophecy,

phesy, but I have laid before you, the miserable Condition of this People ; and that which adds to their desperate Circumstances is, that the two Factions hate one another irreconcilably.

*Johns.* Pray what is the outward presence of their Quarrel ? The real cause, you said, was for Places and Preferments ?

*Smith.* The pretences are Religion and Loyalty ; for the *Mulmuts* say, that the *Fumsums* are not half so Religious as they are, nor yet so well affected to the Monarchy and *Dorgambo* as they are.

*Johns.* I have heard that nothing will sharpen the edge of a Sword better than Religion ; But do the *Mulmuts* lead better Lives than the *Fumsums* ? Are they a Juster, Honester People ? Do they pay their Debts better ? Do they exercise more Civility, Courtesy, and Charity, than the others ? Do they live more Frugally ? And are they willing to serve their Country for less Salaries ? If so, 'tis pity but that they should have all the publick Trusts to themselves, having Ability and Integrity sufficient to discharge them. And this is the way that I would advise *Dorgambo* to take, in order to raise a Spirit of Virtue among her People, viz. to lessen the Pensions and Salaries belonging to publick Trusts, and so make experiment who will serve his Country out of a principle of Honour : Hereby she will see who are the best Friends to their Queen and Country, and by this means a great deal of Riot and Excess will be prevented, and Sobriety and Frugality will be encouraged : The Nation will not be Mad nor Drunk, when they are sending up their Ninety nine Men, to advise the Queen in any Difficulties, and to provide for the publick Weal.

*Smith.* Sir, I concur Heartily with you in this expedient ; and look upon Frugality as absolutely necessary to the Happiness of any Nation : It answers

two ends at once ; for it keeps Men in their Wits, and keeps them Honest too. Whereas Extravagant Expence renders Men practicable to designing Politicians, even so far, as to betray their Country, as *Rome* was betray'd to *Julius Caesar*.

*Johns.* And besides, another Advantage will arise to the Publick ; for what is cut off from the extravagant Salaries, will be saved to the publick Revenue : So that if to make a People Virtuous, Wise, and Rich, be of any advantage to a Nation, this expedient being Wisely digested, will go a great way. Nay, I am perswaded, that if by degrees, or at a seasonable juncture, all Salaries belonging to Honourable Trusts were quite taken away, such Men might be found out, who would discharge those Trusts with greater Diligence and Integrity than at present ; for all Men are naturally sensible to Praise : The appetite of Glory is Natural and Honourable. Nay, I may say, that the *Natural* Inclination of all Men leads them to Good rather than to Evil. Vice must become Fashionable, before many Men will give into it ; there is scarce a Man living, but who would endeavour to maintain his Credit among his Friends and Acquaintance ; and would also be desirous to be well-esteem'd of by his Country, if he were capable to attain such an Honour. Virtue is catching as well as Vice ; now suppose there were at present but one Man of Honour in all *Van Dunk's* Island, who would discharge a publick Trust without a Salary ; I cannot but think that the Queen, or Supreme Council of Ninety Nine, or perhaps both together, will decree some Honourable Inscription at least, if not a Statue, to be erected in some publick Place to preserve his Memory : And this proceeding would encourage others, and raise a Spirit of publick Virtue in the Land, which is never to be hoped for from Salaries, which too often are dearly Bought, and extravagantly Spent : But this method

wisely

wisely pursued, would make the Affairs of the Island turn upon a point of Honour as they ought to do.

*Smith.* And 'twould be a happy turn for a sinking Nation ; but I doubt that this Scheme is like some Demonstration I have heard of to prove a perpetual Motion ; against which there is no Objection, but that 'tis impracticable.

*Johns.* Why so Mr. *Smith* ? When 'tis evident that the Men of the Island, however extravagant they be, yet have some relish of Honour left among them ; Why else do they covet Court-places, and sometimes pay dear for them ? Why do they spend so much in treating their Countrymen, to recommend them even to expensive Places where no Salaries are allowed ? I make no doubt but that some Honest Man may be found out in all Countries, if they were carefully sought after ; there is indeed this difference between Knaves and Honest Men, Knaves will find out their way to the Court of themselves, but Honest Men expect to be look'd for. 'Tis not agreeable to a Man of Honour, to impose himself upon Court or Country either ; but if *Dorgambo* would take a fitting opportunity to declare her Satisfaction, if an Honest and Wise Man would accept of such a publick Trust with such a small competent Salary, she will soon hear of a fit Person for the Employment ; and then 'tis fit that she should send an Honourable Message to desire his acceptance of it, and that she should also give him Honourable Countenance in the Discharge of it ; and who can doubt but that this honourable Person, tho' no *Titulado*, will be able to recommend one, at least, if not more, such as himself is ; so that hereby the progress of Honour may increase, till it find Universal acceptance in Court and Country.

*Smith.* This is not altogether so impracticable as at first, I took it to be, *Birds of a Feather will flock together*, one Honest Man may be acquainted with another, and he

he again with a third ; but still 'tis unreasonable to expect that Men of Honour should leave their profitable Callings to attend a publick Trust for little or nothing.

*Johns.* Very right Sir ; but yet it may suit with the Circumstances of some Men to accept of Places upon the conditions I have mention'd, either with small competent Salaries, or without them : There may be some in the Island of plentiful Estates, who do Audit all their own Accounts, and understand Arithmetick ; and one of these Men may be able and willing to take upon himself the Charge of *Dorgambo's* Exchequer, and administer it faithfully, if honourably call'd thereunto : Nay, over and above, this Honourable Person will teach *Dorgambo* Himself so much Arithmetick ( which she ought to learn ) as will enable her to look into her own Affairs, and to know when the publick Revenue is rightly administred ; for hereby this publick Officer will acquit himself to his Sovereign Queen with Nice Honour ; nor will he be wanting to lay his Accounts before the Council of Ninety Nine, that they also may be sensible of his Ability and Integrity.

*Smith.* But pray then stop here a little Mr. *Johnson*. Suppose I had this honourable Trust committed to me in ever so honourable a manner, I own that I should be highly pleased with it, and should never be satisfy'd till both Queen and States of the Island had fully understood my Accounts, and were fully satisfied how Honourably I had discharg'd my Office ; but then suppose that *Dorgambo* had Commanded me to have applied some part of the publick Revenue to another Use than what it was originally apply'd unto, How should I, in such a Case, clear my Account to the States of the Island ?

*Johns.* Nay, Sir, if the Root of the Government be Corrupted, there is no Reformation to be hoped for

for; 'all you can do in such a Case, is to lay down your Office rather than misapply (unless in case of absolute necessity, such as you are sure the States will justify) any part of the publick Revenue; which may the easier be done, because it is of so little or no value, that it cannot tempt you to lose your Credit for it: And then 'twill be your Duty both in Wisdom and Honour, to satisfy the States, if they require it, of the Reason why you laid down your Office. Perhaps they may admonish *Dorgambo*, and intreat you to resume the Office; and if the same thing should happen again, they may take the Treasury into their own Hands, and I dare undertake, that they will (if you should Dye) find a Man fit to be trusted, if there be one in the whole Island; and if I was one of the Ninety Nine, I would move for a Statue and honourable Inscription, to be set up for you in the Treasury Chamber.

*Smith.* Truly, Sir, this Honour which you would do me, might be of no great charge to the Publick, tho' I should be as proud as Monsieur *Pillars* is at present of the Cannon, which the *French King* his Master has lately given him to plant upon his Castle; this being the first Honour of that sort which that grand Monarch ever bestowed upon a Subject. 'Tis usually said, That a Man may learn from his Enemy; and I suspect that you have learnt the Expedient you have been speaking upon, from the same *French King*, who has of late laid so many Taxes upon the publick Trusts in his Kingdom, that he is Served for little or nothing throughout all his Dominions.

*Johns.* And yet no Prince is better serv'd, which is Reason enough to borrow his Plan upon a necessary occasion; and I dare be bold to say, that let any Nation make use of the same methods to support their publick Weal, which he makes use of to support his Tyranny, and that Nation will not repeat their imitation

tion of this Monarch ; but yet I can truly say to you upon this occasion, that I took my Plan not from Monsieur *Louis*, but from the Flourishing time of the *Roman Commonwealth*, when the publick Salaries were small, and the Service great. The *Romans* had then no Passion for heaping up great Estates, but had a true relish of Honour, and to gain that, they sometimes spent immense Wealth which they had carried away from their Enemies against whom they had made War ; however, 'tis no matter from whence I took my Plan, if it will but put a stop to the decaying Virtue and increasing Luxury of *Van Dunk's Island* 'tis all that you required from me ; and if you have any regard for *Dorgambo*, or the Island, you may recommend the expedient to them ; but if they are grown such a stupid and worthless People, that they are not worth Saving, you may save your self the trouble.

*Smith.* Truly Mr. *Johnson* I have some sort of concern for the Island, because my Brother, who serves his Apprentiship to a *Dutch Merchant* in *Ceyton*, is now admitted to Live and Trade in *Van Dunk's Island* and I having lately been with him in *Holland*, he told me all this Story which I have particularly related to you, pitying the Condition of the Island, which he call'd his Country, because he left his Family there and said moreover, that Queen *Dorgambo* had accepted a small present of Red Herrings from him, and spake kindly to him ; so that for her sake, and the sake of the Island, he should be glad to give any assistance to it, and when he comes to *London*, (as I expect him shortly) I will communicate your expedient to him

*Johns.* With all my Heart, Mr. *Smith*, I love to do Good for sake's sake, and would oblige the Man in the Moon if I were able ; but you were saying that the Factions quarrelled about Religion, pray tell me what Religion are they of ?

*Smith*

*Smith.* They have very little, or rather none at all, in their Practice ; but both Parties Worship one and the same God, *Somonocodam* the God of *Siam*, of whom Father *Tachard*, a *French* Missionary to that Kingdom, hath lately given an account, that he was Born of a Virgin impregnated by the Beams of the Sun.

*Johns.* A pretty sort of a God for *Mulmuts* and *Fumfums* to quarrel about ; but when they have but one God in all, methinks there should not be so much quarrelling about him. The Old *Romans* had between Four and Five Thousand Gods, and yet had no Quarrel about 'em all : They Tollerated all of 'em, and all their Worshipers equally. But how can these Islanders quarrel about their God, when there can be no hopes of drawing him into a Party against himself?

*Smith.* Their Quarrels are about meer Trifles, not worth mentioning. All of the Inhabitants during the time of their Religious Worship, are accustomed to wear small bugle Beads about their Necks and Shoulders ; but the *Mulmuts* wear Yellow Beads, and the *Fumfums* Blue ones : And this makes the Quarrel between 'em. A meer Trifle——

*Johns.* Were they not Religious Bugles I should think so too ; but Religion, or what commonly passeth for such, has usually no farther Rule over Men's Actions, but as it serves.

*First,* To kindle an Indignation against those of a different Opinion or Practice, tho' in Matters of small moment.

*Secondly,* To fill Men's Heads with Terrours, when they are apprehensive of any Danger. And,

*Thirdly,* Above all, to put into 'em, an unaccountable fervour for the practice of some outward Acts of Devotion, which, however performed or neglected, have no influence at all upon their Morals.

*Smith.* Surely what you say as to this Point, you mean to restrain only to false Religion.

*Johns.* You may be sure Mr. *Smith*, I cannot mean this of True Religion, which carries quite another spirit in it

*Smith.* But what is the True Religion ?

*Johns.* Mine is.

*Smith.* And is not mine ?

*Johns.* Yes, Mr. *Smith*, 'tis very likely.

*Smith.* But what if your Religion and mine should differ, how then ?

*Johns.* Why then both may be right ; *Somonocodam* may like Blue Beads as well as Yellow, and Yellow as well as Blue, and 'tis strange that the Inhabitants of *Van Dunk's* Island have not obtained this notion in Religion, since it prevails so much in *China*, which is not very far from them. A *Chinese* will commonly say to an *European*, that his Doctrine may be True, tho' it be ever so different from his own Sentiment ; saying, that it may be so in *Europe*, tho' it be not so in *China*.

*Smith.* Truly I am apt to think that a great deal of Quarrel may be avoided, if Men had not this unaccountable Pride in them, to make themselves the Standards of other Mens Religion ; and therefore when you see your Brother, tell him, that at his return, he should advise *Dorgamba*, to Tollerate both sorts of Bugles in the Island, and to wear both sorts of them in her Royal Necklace ; to own the Truth of both Religions, and thereby allay the Spirit of both Factions : But this is not to be done before she has settled the Affairs of her Administration in good Hands, and when that is done, she may easily overcome all difficulties.

*Johns.* But all this while I forgot to ask you, How the People of this Island, being so Dissolute and Factious, have kept their Liberty thus long.

*Smith.*

*Smith.* By meer Witchcraft as I suppose ; for the People are, by long custom, inclined to Slavery so far, as Three Quarters, and a Half Quarter extends : And if *Dorgambo* her self would not suffer them to be her Slaves to such a degree, they would rise up in Rebellion against her. But as for the last half Quarter, which should perfect their Slavery, they will not go that length either led or driven ; they will lose their Lives rather than change a Blue Bead for a Yellow one. A former Queen made use of a Sovereign Power to make such an Alteration, and Perish'd in the Attempt ; and therefore the present Queen is so Wise as to let them all ride their one Hobby-Horses after their accustomed Manners, and I think that this is the Wisest way any Sovereign can take with such a People. Was not this the way *Mr. Johnson* which the *Romans* took, when (as you said) they had Four or Five Thousand Gods amongst them, and yet no Quarrel about Religion ?

*Johns.* They tollerated all Religions, as not thinking it worth their while to quarrel about Matters of which they knew but little ; and if we *Europeans* of this Age, did but consider how great a part of our Religion is Mysterious, we should find but little reason to be so Dogmatical and Quarrellsom about it, as we are. There is indeed in the *Christian* Religion but one Doctrine, which the Old *Roman* would not have Tollerated, I mean the Doctrine of Eternal Damnation to those who do not believe in *Christ* ; for this Opinion, would have engaged all Good Christians, to bring all their Acquaintance over to their Religion, which Zeal, would have been disallowed as being apt to breed Innovations in the State ; so that by working upon Mens minds through Fear, the State-Religion might have been endangered, as it afterwards happened to be ; of which *Pliny* gives this Account to the Emperor *Trajan*, viz.  
That

*That when the Country People brought their Cattle to the Market, no body would buy them to offer in Sacrifice to the Gods ; because Christianity had so much prevailed in that part of the Empire where his Province lay. But, notwithstanding, that this Christian Dogmat, which I now mentioned, might have startled the Romans, yet such were the admirable Morals which were Taught by Jesus Christ, that had the Romans well understood them, they would never have raised any Persecution against the Christians.*

*Smith.* In my Mind, 'tis a shame to Christians, that in Spite of the best Morals that were ever given forth, they should be as violent Persecutors of those who differ from them, as ever the Pagans were of them.

*Johrf.* All Religious quarrels arise from Pride and Ignorance blended together, and then call'd by the Name of Zeal; and I suppose 'tis this sort of Zeal, which has set the *Mulmut* and *Fumsum* together by the Ears, about the Yellow and Blue Bugles; nor have the *European Christians*, whether with Beades or without Beades, whether Ceremonies or Anti ceremonies, any right to laugh at these poor *Indians*, which Consideration makes me sometimes say, (though I am blamed for it) That *I had rather be a Good Philosopher, than a Bad Christian.*

*Smith.* I am sorry that our Roads must part us at this point; if you will be pleased to ride my way, and take a Dinner with me you shall be welcome, and I give you thanks for the good Society you have afforded me already; but yet I will Ride a little farther, because I will tell you an Objection against your Notion of Moderate Salaries, which I take from the Proceedings of the *French King*, who is at present esteem'd to be the greatest Politician in *Europe*: 'Tis said, That he allows to his chief Officers the greatest Salaries of any Sovereign, to preserve them

them from Corruption ; for no other Prince is able to tempt them by Bribes from the Service of so Bountiful a Master ; and therefore he is serv'd so Faithfully himself, though he can by his Skill in Bribing, withdraw the Allegiance of other great Trustees from their Sovereign Princes, by whom very sufficient Salaries are allow'd them.

*Johns.* But, Sir, I desire that you would be pleas'd to consider, that there is a great disparity between the *French* King's Government and that of *Dorgambo*, the one is as much differing from the other as Light from Darknes ; for the chief end the *French* King aims at, is to subdue, not only his own Native Subjects, but all *Europe* to his absolute Will and Pleasure, and to erect an Universal Tyranny (were it possible ) over the World ; which I take to be the Basest and Meanest Design as was ever carried on by the greatest Villain upon Earth. Wherefore great Salaries are necessary to purchase great Villains to carry on his Design. Now *Dorgambo* having no Design in her Government, but to promote the Peace and Tranquility of Her Subjects, and the general Good and Publick Weal of Her whole Island, 'tis hard to suppose her People to be so prodigiously corrupted, as that no Honest Men should be found, who shall be willing to assist the Publick Weal of the Island, in spite of all Bribery and Corruption. Mankind has a natural inclination to Praise, and an aversion to the contrary, and consequently a greater Inclination to Good than Evil ; and I do not think that *France* it self is so void of all Virtue, but that if the King were capable of forming any Honest Design for the good of his Country, he might find out such Men as would be willing to carry it on without such great Salaries, or indeed any at all. And does not the *French* King by his great Salaries, give sufficient notice to all Nations with whom he

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is concerned, That while they are treating with the *French Court*, they are dealing with such Men who are bribed out of all Sense of Honour and Honesty? and that the Characters and Trusts given them by their great Master, are only marks of the highest Corruption? So that he that is treating with his Bishops or Abbots, is corresponding with *Spiritual Wickednesses in high Places*. But suppose that a Foreign Enemy should enter his Country, and confirm by Proclamation all his Pensioners in their Places, upon Condition that they will desert their Old Master, and take new Service under the Conqueror; the Grand Monarch will find himself in a very tottering Condition, while *Dorgambo's* Throne, supported by the Honour and Love of Her Subjects, will be as steady as the Center of the Earth.

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